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2 abstract
This paper extends the available datasets on the use of macroprudential policies 
in CEE countries, and provides an econometric assessment of the effectiveness of 
these policies in mitigating financial stability risks associated with excessive credit 
growth before the global financial crisis. The model results imply that macro­
prudential policies were more effective in slowing credit to households than credit 
to the non­financial corporate sector, mainly because the latter had access to non­
bank and cross­border credit in addition to domestic bank credit.
Keywords: macroprudential policy, financial stability, credit growth, systemic risk, 
CEE countries
1 IntRoDUctIon
Despite the growing interest in macroprudential policy, we know very little about 
its effectiveness in preserving financial stability and mitigating systemic risks. 
This is largely because only a small number of countries have practical experience 
in conducting macroprudential policy, particularly during the boom stage of the 
cycle. Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries belong to the relatively 
small group that did use macroprudential policy in the run-up to the global finan-
cial crisis. As they are also relatively homogeneous in terms of financial sector 
structure, notably in the importance of foreign-owned banks as suppliers of credit 
to the private sector, CEE countries are an excellent case study for the analysis of 
macroprudential policy effectiveness. 
Most empirical analysis that have considered CEE countries’ macroprudential 
policies so far did so within larger country samples, and without analysing the 
impact of such policies on credit to specific sectors. Table A1 in the appendix sum-
marises the findings of the main studies, which differ significantly in terms of 
analytical focus, data coverage, empirical frameworks and their most important 
findings. This paper examines CEE countries only, and distinguishes between 
credit to households and to non-financial corporate sectors. The sample covers 11 
countries – Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lith-
uania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia – over the period from Q1 2000 
to Q3 2013. Due to the small number of country relative to time observations, we 
estimate panel regressions using the OLS method and cross-section SUR panel-
corrected standard errors, as suggested by Beck and Katz (1995).
To conduct this analysis, we compiled a dataset on the use of macroprudential 
policies in CEE countries. We supplemented data from official sources with find-
ings from a central bank questionnaire specially designed for this purpose and 
several research papers dealing with these countries. Because of the great variety 
of macroprudential tools within and across countries, we had to construct special 
variables to capture the timing and intensity of the use of such tools. 
Our main finding is that, in the run-up to the global financial crisis, macropruden-
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3households than to the non-financial corporate sector. The reason is that house-
hold credit growth was more significantly affected by a larger number of macro-
prudential tools than the growth of credit to non-financial corporations. For the 
latter, it was also much easier to get funding from sources that were not subject to 
macroprudential measures, such as non-bank financial institutions and direct 
cross-border credit. 
Considering the relatively risky lending policy in some of the CEE banks in the 
observed period, these findings also imply that their active macroprudential poli-
cies helped these countries to preserve the stability of their banking systems. This 
additionally confirms the relevance of macroprudential measures for mitigating 
systemic crisis episodes. From the public policy perspective, this is especially 
important because such episodes usually result in huge fiscal costs, which in some 
cases could exceed 55% of GDP (Laeven and Valencia, 2012), while the average 
decline in GDP per capita amounts to 11.5% (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2014). In that 
context, another important aspect of countercyclical macroprudential policy is 
that it also reduces the duration of crisis episodes (Gupta, Mulas-Granados and 
Baldacci, 2009). 
The paper is divided in four parts. Section 2 describes data sources and model 
variables, in particular macroprudential variables constructed for panel regres-
sions. Section 3 lays out the empirical framework and discusses the estimation 
results. Section 4 concludes.
2 MoDel VaRIables anD Data
The variable whose behaviour we are trying to explain is credit to the private sec-
tor in CEE countries. We look separately at total credit to households and total 
credit to the non-financial corporate sector. Total credit to individual sectors 
includes not only domestic bank credit but also that provided by domestic non-
bank financial institutions and banks from other countries. For households, domes-
tic banks provide the bulk of credit, while for the corporate sector the latter two 
sources are also important. These variable are expressed as either quarterly rates 
of change (in real terms and seasonally adjusted), or as ratios to GDP. 
The main variables with which we are trying to explain credit growth are lagged 
credit growth, GDP growth, changes in interest rates, and the use of various macro-
prudential tools, which are the focus of this study. Lagged credit growth accounts 
for inertia in the evolution of credit; GDP growth is a proxy for fundamental deter-
minants of credit growth such as real income; interest rates are a proxy for the price 
of credit; and macroprudential tools are exogenous regulatory interventions aimed 
at limiting the pace of credit growth for financial stability reasons. We expect high-
er credit growth in the past and stronger GDP growth to be positive correlates of 
credit growth, and higher interest rates and tighter macroprudential tools to be 
negative correlates. We collected the macroeconomic data from central banks 
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4 Unlike monetary policy instruments such as interest rates, macroprudential tools 
come in a much greater variety. Most are not continuously adjusted over time. 
Using them in an empirical analysis therefore requires two related tasks: first, 
constructing time series for different macroprudential instruments that would 
reflect, to the greatest extent possible, their “intensity”; and second, aggregating 
instruments of disparate nature into a small number of composite indicators that 
affect economic behaviour on similar margins. 
Underlying this exercise is the even deeper issue of the availability of information 
and data on different macroprudential tools, many of which were not even known 
under this name ten or more years ago. To overcome this initial problem, we col-
lected information through direct communication with central banks, asking them 
to fill a questionnaire on the use of different macroprudential tools through time 
from Q1 2000 to Q1 2013. The starting point for designing the questionnaire was 
the database presented by Lim et al. (2011) that asked questions about the time of 
introduction, tightening, loosening, other adjustments and termination of different 
tools, meaning that we obtained the information about these measures through 
time. We requested information specifically about instruments such as loan-to-
value ratios, debt-to-income ratios, limits on foreign currency lending, credit 
growth restrictions, maturity mismatch restrictions, general reserve requirements, 
other reserve requirements, capital requirements, risk weights, and provisioning 
requirements. According to Lim et al. (2011, 2013) and our own analysis of 
macroprudential policy in individual CEE countries, these measures are the ones 
that been most often used for preventing systemic risks and increasing financial 
systems’ resilience. Finally, we supplemented the questionnaire answers with data 
from the IMF, central banks’ annual reports and the analysis by Lim et al. (2011) 
and Geršl and Jašova (2014). 
To use these data in panel regressions, we identified similar measures from differ-
ent countries and created three groups of indicators:
1) Binary variables, which take on the value of 1 in periods when a given meas-
ure is used, and 0 otherwise. If all countries use a given measure, the variable 
takes the value of 1 when a given measure is “tighter” than average, and 0 
otherwise. One shortcoming of this approach is that it cannot differentiate 
the intensity of a measure beyond a binary above/below average value. 
Another is that it cannot account for tightening or loosening of measures. 
2) “Step function” variables, which increase or decrease depending on whether 
a given measure is getting tighter or looser. For instance, for minimum 
reserve requirements (RR) we set the value of the step function at zero for 
RR ≤ 2%, which is a typical value in CEE, and then increase it in steps of 25 
basis points for each percentage point increase in the minimum RR set by 
authorities. For capital adequacy ratios (CAR), we set the value of the step 
function at zero for CAR ≤ 8%, and then increase it in steps of 50 basis 
points for each percentage point increase in the minimum CAR. The result-
ing step function is a relatively good proxy for the intensity of given macro-
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53) Actual values, in percent or percentage points, for prudential tools such as 
general reserve requirements, loan-to-value, or debt-to-income ratios. 
A further complication in comparing macroprudential tools across countries is the 
varying scope, calculation basis, and other features of different instruments. For 
instance, the coverage, allocation basis, calculation method and other details differ 
greatly for reserve requirements, and even more so for capital adequacy ratios. To 
reduce the bias these subtle but important differences might induce in regression 
estimates, the panels assessing the impact of macroprudential tools on credit 
growth use binary and step function variables (table 1), while the panels assessing 
the impact of macroprudential tools on different types of credit use the step vari-
ables and actual values of individual tools (table 2).
In addition to constructing the variables assessing the intensity of macroprudential 
tools by type, we aggregated them in individual countries in order to assess how the 
total intensity of macroprudential policy may have evolved over time. Instruments 
included in the calculation were administrative credit growth restrictions, capital 
requirements, limitations on foreign currency lending, limits on maturity mismatch-
es, marginal reserve requirements, general reserve requirements, and provisioning 
requirements. In the panels assessing the impact of macroprudential policy on credit 
to households, we also included loan-to-value ratios and debt service ratios. 
We constructed two aggregate indicators of macroprudential policy intensity: first 
a simple sum of the values of binary variables, indicating the number of measures 
used at a given point in time (solid line in figure 1); and second, a sum of the step 
function variables, indicating changes in overall intensity of underlying measures 
(dashed line). In the pre-crisis period, Croatia leads in terms of both categories, 
followed by Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania. The Czech Republic used no macro-
prudential instruments in this period, while Slovenia only used the reserve 
requirement higher than 2% before adopting the euro in 2007.
The same picture emerges from other databases on macroprudential policy, such 
as the one based on the IMF’s Financial Stability and Macroprudential Policy 
Survey presented by Lim et al. (2011).
Greater use of macroprudential policies in CEE than elsewhere in Europe can be 
largely explained by the financial sector structure and the overall level of financial 
development in this region. The financial sector in CEE is characterised by foreign 
ownership of domestic banks: foreign bank subsidiaries account for up to 95% of 
domestic banking sector assets. This share increased rapidly in the late 1990s and 
the early 2000s. Prior to that, banks in CEE had little experience with risk assess-
ment and financial markets were repressed or non-existent. Financial liberalisa-
tion, which included banking deregulation (or, in some countries, the establish-
ment of commercial banking in the first place) and the removal of capital controls, 
led to a surge in credit growth. For countries in the sample, credit to the private 
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7As domestic saving rates were low and credit demand was high due to rapid eco-
nomic growth, much of the credit was sourced from parent banks in Western Europe. 
According to the BIS consolidated banking statistics, gross cross-border bank flows 
to CEE countries in the sample thus amounted on average to 9% of GDP per year 
during 2002-07, or, in cumulative terms, 38% of GDP on average over this period. 
Apart from being attracted by the relatively strong economic activity in these coun-
tries, foreign banks were willing to supply so much credit to the region also partly 
because CEE countries were in the process of EU accession, which strengthened 
investors’ confidence in local legal systems and economic policies. 
Large capital inflows in an environment of shallow financial markets quickly led 
to macroeconomic and financial stability imbalances, including high current 
account deficits (often in the range of 10-15% of GDP) and very rapid growth of 
property prices (Rohatinski, 2009). The solution was to try to control credit growth 
with alternative tools, ranging from administrative credit controls, to reserve 
requirements or to prudential measures aimed at specific groups of borrowers. 
Macroprudential policy in CEE was thus born out of necessity, to manage a credit 
boom rapidly getting out of hand.
3 eMPIRIcal fRaMeWoRK anD estIMatIon ResUlts
Unlike traditional panels, where the country sample is large and time period short, 
our panels are longitudinal, as they have more period than country observations. 
According to Beck and Katz (1995), using the FGLS to estimate parameters in 
such cases can result in a significant underestimation of parameter variability, i.e. 
“overconfidence”. Following their approach, we estimate our panels using the 
OLS method and calculate cross-section SUR panel-corrected standard errors, 
which are more reliable than standard errors computed using the FGLS method. 
Two other econometric problems were the use of a lagged dependent variable and 
country fixed effects. The standard tests commonly used for panels with a larger 
number of cross-sections are not reliable for longitudinal panels. The literature 
dealing with this type of panel (i.e. Kristensen and Wawro, 2003; and Beck and 
Katz, 2004) shows that in such cases it is appropriate to apply the lagged variable 
as the method for removing serial correlation, while the problem of accounting for 
the unobserved heterogeneity across countries and controlling for omitted, time-
invariant macroeconomic variables that may differ from country to country could 
be solved by using fixed effects and calculating panel-corrected standard errors.
The main estimating equation is:
 yi,t = α + μi + Xit β + εi,t ,  (1)
where 
y = quarterly growth rate of household or non-financial corporate sector credit;
i = 1...11 countries; 
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8 µ = country fixed effects; 
α = constant term;
Xit = matrix of control variables, with
x1 = lagged credit growth (households or corporate sector);
x2 = GDP growth (quarterly rate);
x3 =  interest rate on loans (households, or corporate sector), change of quarterly 
average; 
x4 = macroprudential variables (level and/or step variables described above);
ε = error term.
Any attempt to explain dynamics of credit growth with adjustments in interest 
rates and macroprudential measures raises the issue of endogeneity, as policy 
adjustments depend on the evolution of credit growth. To mitigate this problem, 
we lagged interest rate and macroprudential variables by one quarter and com-
pared coefficients from regressions with and without lagged macroprudential 
variables, as proposed by Nier et al. (2012). The signs, levels and significance of 
estimated coefficients did not differ much. We interpret these results as evidence 
that endogeneity between credit growth and adjustments of macroprudential 
instruments is not a major problem in our sample. Nevertheless, following Nier et 
al. (2012), we interpret the estimated coefficients on macroprudential variables 
with caution, paying greater attention to their sign than magnitude, especially in 
the case of composite indicators.
 
Regression results are presented in tables 1 and 2, and tables A2 and A3 in the 
appendix.
Table 1 presents estimates of the overall impact of macroprudential policy on 
credit growth. The estimated coefficients on lagged credit growth and real GDP 
growth are both positive and statistically significant, in line with theoretical pre-
dictions. The coefficients on lagged interest rates are negative but not statistically 
significant. In other words, past changes of interest rates do not seem to be sig-
nificant determinants of current credit growth. To measure the overall impact of 
macroprudential policy on credit growth we used the binary and step function 
variables described above. When macroprudential policy was tighter than average 
in the past quarter (i.e. the binary variable took on the value of 1), credit growth 
slowed significantly only in the case of household loans. When macroprudential 
policy was tightening in the previous quarter (i.e. the step function was increas-
ing), credit growth slowed significantly in the case of household loans. 
Table 2 presents estimates of the impact of individual macroprudential tools on 
credit growth. We consider nine macroprudential tools: administrative limits on 
credit growth, capital requirements, limits on currency mismatches, marginal 
reserve requirements, provisioning requirements, general reserve requirements, 
increased risk weights, debt-to-income ratios, and loan-to-value ratios. With the 
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9the regression as step variables as they are difficult to compare due to their specific 
nature, the remaining six macroprudential tools are used in levels (i.e. per cent or 
percentage points). Growth of credit to households responds, with varying degrees 
of significance, to changes in administrative limits on credit growth, general 
reserve requirements, debt-to-income ratios, and loan-to-value ratios. Growth of 
credit to the non-financial corporate sector responds significantly to changes in 
administrative limits on credit growth, limits on currency mismatches, as well as 
provisioning and general reserve requirements. 
Table 1 
Impact of overall macroprudential policy on credit growth
loans to household sector loans to corporate sector





























Total level of 
macroprudential  





Total level of 
macroprudential 





Observations: 264 264 332 332
R2: 0.75 0.75 0.33 0.33
F-statistic: 55.8 55.68 10.98 10.98
Note: Total level of macroprudential policy – d represents the sum of binary variables or the 
number of used macroprudential measures and instruments in a given moment. Total level of 
macroprudential policy – step represents the sum of constructed step indicators for individual 
macroprudential measures. All estimations are made using OLS; period SUR panel­corrected 
standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%. 
Source: Author᾿s calculations.
These results suggest that macroprudential policy was probably more effective in 
slowing the growth of credit to households than the growth of credit to non-finan-
cial corporations before the crisis: as can be seen from table 3, household credit 
growth responded significantly to a larger number of macroprudential measures. 
These findings are in line with findings presented by Cerutti, Claessens and 
Laeven (2015) who also show that the negative relationship between macropru-
dential policies is stronger for households than for the corporate sector. This result 
is not surprising when one considers that households in CEE generally had access 
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10 non-bank financial institutions and banks in other countries, were much more eas-
ily available to non-financial corporations. In particular, domestic subsidiaries of 
foreign banks, which were subject to macroprudential regulation, often directed 
their corporate customers in CEE to their parent banks in home countries in West-
ern Europe, or to domestic non-bank financial institutions in CEE, which were 
often established as separate entities operated by parent banks.
Table 2 
Impact of individual macroprudential measures on credit growth
 credit 
growth limit 















































































Note: This table presents only the estimated coefficients on macroprudential variables; for 
complete results see appendix tables A2 and A3. 
Level presents the actual value of a specific instrument (i.e. general reserve requirement of 2%).
All estimations are made using OLS; period SUR panel­corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
* significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 10%. 
Source: Author᾿s calculations.
4 conclUsIon
Findings in this paper indicate that, contrary to the widespread belief that they 
have limited practical experience with macroprudential policy, countries in CEE 
used a wide variety of macroprudential tools before the global financial crisis – 
and before these tools were even known as “macroprudential”. To show this, we 
compiled a quarterly database of macroprudential measures used in 11 CEE coun-
tries from 2000 to 2013, and compared it with existing macroprudential policy 
databases for other European countries.
The main motivation for the use of macroprudential tools in CEE was to slow 
credit growth in an environment of heavy capital inflows and monetary policy 
frameworks largely focusing on exchange rate stability. In the language of the 
external policy “trilemma”, with free capital flows and not always very flexible 
exchange rates, many CEE countries could not use domestic interest rates to try to 
offset the macroeconomic and financial stability effects of capital inflows, and 
therefore had to rely on alternative, more direct tools to control credit growth. 
In using macroprudential tools, CEE countries seem to have been more successful 
in slowing credit growth to the household sector than to non-financial corpora-
tions. The main reason seems to be that the latter could turn to financial institu-
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11ures, or to banks abroad. Both these sources were often institutionally related to 
foreign-owned bank subsidiaries in CEE. This points to the issue of financial 
institutions’ attempts to circumvent macroprudential measures through less regu-
lated segments of the financial system. To be effective, macroprudential tools 
would thus have to cover comprehensively all key segments of the domestic finan-
cial system, and would even require some international cooperation by relevant 
policymakers.
Disclosure statement 
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